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The Mediation of Hope: 
Communication Technologies and Inequality in Perspective 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Digital technological innovation is taken by many to signify societal 
progress and the promise of equitable and sustainable societies. Others 
link the complex digital system to multiple and persistent inequalities and 
to a concern that innovations in areas such as artificial intelligence, 
algorithmic computation and machine learning and their applications are 
being introduced in a manner that suggests, at least to some, that humans 
may lose their authority over the future pathway of digital technologies. 
Research traditions including economics, the economics of technological 
innovation and critical studies of technology and society are discussed as 
is the predominant focus of digital economy policy. It is suggested that 
critical interdisciplinary engagements could influence digital economy 
policy makers to consider alternative digital technology innovation 
pathways and more proactive policies that could yield a better future.  
 
Keywords: innovation, artificial intelligence, digital economy, 
employment and skills, inequality, dignity 
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Introduction1 
 
The New York Times asks “Google Wants Driverless Cars, but Do We?” (Kitman, 
2016) and investor confidence seems more likely to provide the answer than public 
deliberation about the adjustments and accommodations needed to deploy this 
technology. Driverless cars are one of the possible steps along the technological 
innovation pathway towards increasing dependence of human beings on automation and 
the artificial intelligence applications embedded in so-called intelligent machines. The 
automation of everyday life, whether in the form of the Internet-of-Things or advanced 
robotics, is depicted, especially in the popular literature, as signifying societal progress, 
the promise of a better life, and, ultimately, the reduction of social and economic 
inequality. These outcomes depend on multiple technical and non-technical factors and it 
does not follow that these developments will improve the quality of life overall or 
contribute to reduced social and economic inequality. Nonetheless, for some, the digital 
technological innovation pathway is singular and it is often depicted as being inevitable 
even if “there will be heartbreak, conflict, and confusion in addition to incredible 
benefits” (Kelly, 2016, p. 267).  
 
Investment in the development and use of novel digital applications, including 
intelligent or social machines and robots, supported by algorithms and machine learning, 
is expected by many industry leaders to raise income levels and foster movement along a 
singular pathway through a fourth industrial revolution that “will fundamentally alter the 
way we live, work, and relate to one another” (Schwab, 2016, para. 1). Introducing 
measures that could better address social and economic inequality or the potential for a 
loss of human authority and control over the workings of advanced digital information 
                                                 
1 The author gratefully acknowledges the very helpful comments of two anonymous 
referees, the editors of this special issue, and Edward Steinmueller. Any errors or 
omissions are my responsibility. 
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processing systems is often seen as unnecessary and damaging.2 This view is echoed in 
the neoclassical economics and science, technology and innovation (STI) economics 
traditions as a result of assumptions employed about the relationship between 
technological innovation and the economy. For these scholars, hopes for a better future 
are mediated by a discourse that privileges expectations about benefits from the current 
digital technological innovation pathway. The value of achieving these expectations 
sooner rather than later means that policy interventions to mitigate problems should be 
introduced only with caution, and as a response to market developments.  
 
Critical traditions in the social sciences do not make the same assumptions and 
are therefore able to treat the relationship between technological innovation and society 
as contingent and conditioned by cultural, social, political and economic factors. This 
means that contributors to these traditions typically challenge the inevitability of any 
particular technological innovation pathway. This, in turn, leads some of them, in the 
contemporary period of rapid innovation in intelligent machines, to ask whether 
technological and societal transformations are consistent with human flourishing. For 
some, this means that people should be able to engage in “a kind of living that is active” 
(Nussbaum, 2012, p. 342). It also suggests a kind of living where human needs and 
values such as altruism, solidarity and dignity are respected and the socio-technical 
environment is consistent with increasing equality and sustainability (Annett, 2016; 
Calabrese, 2017; Castells & Himanen, 2014).3 This paper examines views from 
economics and other traditions in the social sciences that are concerned with the 
relationship between digital technology innovation and societal outcomes. The potential 
for a productive engagement among researchers working in otherwise parallel traditions 
is examined with the aim of assessing whether such an engagement can help to focus 
                                                 
2 See Smith & Anderson (2014). Industry leaders report mixed expectations about the 
benefits and risks of digital technological innovation to 2025.  
3 For example, the World Happiness Report 2016 and the World Social Science Report 
2016. 
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digital economy policy on measures that could encourage a reorientation of the digital 
technological innovation pathway. Such a reorientation might encourage consideration of 
whether the extension of calculative (intelligent) machines throughout society is 
consistent with an inclusive and more equitable society.  
 
 
Technological Innovation, the Promise of Adjustment and Digital Economy Policy  
 
The view that digital technologies will offer solutions to societal problems is a 
familiar and consistent theme in the academic literature in the economics discipline and 
in the economics of science, technology and innovation (STI) field.4 Neoclassical 
economics focuses on the “diffusion” of innovations in the digital technology 
marketplace (David, 2012) and on the competitive dynamics of, for instance, digital 
platforms and services. However, the complexity of the markets in which companies 
operate involves many second and further order effects that give rise to fundamental 
uncertainty and cannot therefore be readily anticipated or modeled (Evans & 
Schmalensee, 2014). The STI economics tradition, in contrast, is concerned with complex 
factors that give rise to the Schumpeterian creative destruction of incumbent companies 
by innovative entrepreneurs. In both traditions, innovation is seen “as a highly uncertain 
process responding to opportunities as they arise” (Fagerberg et al., 2016, p. 20) and the 
principal aim is to exploit the technological trajectory or pathway that leads to economic 
gain. In neoclassical and STI economics, it is assumed that innovation and creative 
destruction are essential features of the processes in the economy that generate economic 
growth, productivity gains and improved social welfare.  
 
                                                 
4 There is a less prominent strand in the STI field associated with institutional political 
economy and sociology, see for instance, Lemstra and Melody (2014), Mansell (1996), or 
Miles (2000). 
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With respect to policy in the digital economy in the wake of innovation, the 
position in both traditions is usually to adopt a “wait and see” approach which favors 
adjustments to disruptive changes in technologies only after they have reached the 
marketplace and demonstrated their effects.5 The assumption underlying these 
approaches is that while disruption is to be expected, the market will deliver ameliorative 
and compensating effects to this disruption and that the “after effect” of technological 
change is likely to be positive. Thus, for example, the results of aggregate analysis of 
indicators of investment and the diffusion of advanced digital technologies indicate that 
such investment is strongly associated with reductions in economic inequality, evidenced 
by data showing positive income and growth effects when countries are compared 
internationally (Pepper & Garrity, 2015).6 It follows that, because next generation 
innovative intelligent technologies may have useful potential, they should be brought to 
market as rapidly as possible as a result of public and private investment in research and 
development. The STI economics tradition is more likely than is the neoclassical 
economics tradition to see a need for policy intervention to smooth the market adjustment 
process in the face of creative destruction since it pays more attention to multiple 
economic factors and it is not assumed that adjustment happens spontaneously (Freeman 
                                                 
5 For example, although all productivity improving technological change can be expected 
to create “technological unemployment” (by allowing the same amount of output to be 
produced using fewer inputs of capital and labour), this first order effect is moderated or 
overcome by second order effects such as a decline in the price (assuming competition) 
that will increase the quantity demanded and once again stimulate demand for capital and 
labour inputs (see Vivarelli, 2014). Because the size of second order “compensatory” 
effects cannot be anticipated ex ante, it is appropriate to intervene only when they can be 
demonstrated to be insufficient to overcome the labor displacing first order effects. 
6 Based on a global analysis of World Bank data 1990‒2010 showing global poverty 
(measured at US$1.25/day at purchasing power parity) falling in relation to rising digital 
technology (mobile subscriptions and internet users) penetration (Pepper & Garrity, 
2015). 
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& Louça, 2001).7 Social justice and equity and the assessment of the quality of life from 
socio-cultural or political perspectives and values are sometimes noted as issues requiring 
consideration in the STI economics literature, but this research tradition has not 
traditionally emphasized these issues (Schot & Steinmueller 2016). Within these 
economic frameworks, market intervention via government policy is seen as a potential 
threat to the speed of bringing digital products and services to market, deferring gains 
that might be achieved to the substantial detriment of consumers and citizens and the 
competitive position of a country’s industries.  
 
The economics-inspired framings of the impacts of disruptive digital technologies 
and the appropriate policy responses influence the digital economy policy agendas in 
many countries and regions around the world. However, global evidence of a 
correspondence between digital technology investment and positive income and 
economic growth effects is inconsistent with statistical evidence indicating that the 
diffusion of digital technologies also seems to be associated, albeit, not in a consistent or 
straightforward way, with rising income inequality within countries (Bauer, 2016). The 
multiple factors contributing to the complex interactions that account for inconsistent 
results are not fully understood. In addition, however great the contribution of the 
diffusion of advanced digital technologies within countries to inequality, the evidence of 
growing income inequality in many wealthy countries has become a high level policy 
concern (OECD, 2015). Insofar as the rapid take up of digital networks and services and 
new potentials for automating jobs are contributing factors, digital economy policy 
makers are reluctant to intervene in markets as this would risk reducing the rate of 
investment. Thus, for example, the European Digital Single Market Strategy aims to 
support and encourage a flourishing digital marketplace, led principally by private 
investors. The strategy is intended to improve access for consumers and businesses to 
online goods and services and to create the best conditions for the digital network and 
services market to flourish, the goal being to maximize the growth potential of the digital 
                                                 
7 See Bauer and Latzer (2016) for perspectives associated with the economics discipline.  
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economy. Governments are expected to stimulate the growth of the digital economy 
through public and private investment in research and development in network 
technologies, machine learning (cognitive systems), and robotics and new digital systems 
for the health, security, and other sectors. The challenge of adapting to the digital world 
that emerges once these technologies reach the marketplace is seen mainly as a matter for 
business (EC, 2016a).  
 
When there is evidence of uneven progress towards the take up and widespread 
use of advanced digital technologies and services within countries, regions, or cities, it is 
assumed that lagging areas will catch up as a result of targeted public investment, for 
example, in high-tech clusters. Relatively small amounts of public funding (compared to 
private investment) are directed at stimulating investment in broadband network capacity 
and at enhancing the digital skills base. Research on the factors contributing to digital 
divides helps to provide an evidence base for policy interventions of this kind aimed at 
overcoming inequality due to factors such as socioeconomic class, race, gender or 
disability (Ragnedda & Muschert, 2013; Robinson et al., 2015; van Dijk, 2013), but the 
primary goal of digital economy policy is strongly oriented to promoting economic 
growth and competitiveness. 
 
Notwithstanding uncertainty about the scale of the future disruptive impact of 
digital technologies on employment, making the workforce “digital ready” through policy 
initiatives in the education and skills domain is less controversial. A Skills Agenda for 
Europe for higher education has been introduced, for example, which prioritizes 
investment in strengthening computer science, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, and 
robotics skills, together with team working, creative thinking and problem solving skills 
(EC, 2016c). These investments are frequently regarded by policy makers as a sufficient 
response to evidence of a growing mismatch between the skills of the workforce and 
employer demand. The timing and the extent of these sorts of policy interventions can be 
questioned however because the hope is that mismatches between the skills of the 
workforce and demands of employers will be met as a result of market dynamics. The 
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policy discourse tends to confirm this assumption. For instance, a government report on 
artificial intelligence and robotics states that “we know that gains in productivity and 
efficiency, new services and jobs, … are all on the horizon” (emphasis added) (House of 
Commons, 2016, para. 36). Statements of this kind occur despite disputes among 
economists about the scale of the impact of technological change on employment and its 
implications for different categories of workers and their ability to qualify for jobs in the 
digital economy. For instance, Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) argue that the second 
machine age [of intelligent machines and robots] will boost productivity, but with 
adverse effects for low- and middle-skilled workers. Autor (2015) disputes their 
assessment asking skeptically, “why are there still so many jobs?” with the implication 
that advances in digital technologies may not be as disruptive as is sometimes forecast.  
 
Uncertainty about the timing and extent of policy interventions to enhance the 
skills base, or to address weaknesses in digital literacy more generally, is created partly as 
a result of the predominant influence of the neoclassical economic analytical tradition 
where the competitive equilibrium framework positions technological change principally 
as a problem of adjustment to a given distribution of benefits. In economics, 
technological change is taken as synonymous with productivity improvement. 
Technologically induced unemployment or inequalities are expected to be transitional 
and temporary effects that will disappear as markets adjust to their new equilibrium. As 
increasingly sophisticated digital technologies impact on the range of work tasks that can 
be performed by semi- or fully autonomous machines, however, it is difficult to estimate 
the extent to which wage inequality will be exacerbated and over what time frame 
(Atkinson, 2008; Frey & Osborne, 2013). In the STI economics tradition it is typically 
more confidently asserted that adjustment policies with respect to employment and skills 
must be adopted since it is assumed that market dynamics are unlikely to produce a more 
equitable outcome even in the long term. Thus, for example, Freeman and Soete depicted 
digital technologies as “the greatest technological juggernaut that ever rolled” (1994, p. 
39) and they signaled the need to introduce policies in response to the disruptive impacts 
of these technologies on employment several decades ago. Their advice was to introduce 
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policies to adjust to structural rigidities in the economy which give rise to inequality as a 
result of technologically-induced unemployment so as to ensure a better distribution of 
the economic gains from digital technological innovation.  
 
In summary, the dominant orientation of digital economy policy is towards 
stimulating economic competitiveness based on the premise that, if a country does not 
achieve a leadership position in emerging fields of technological innovation such as 
machine learning, big data analytics, artificial intelligence and their applications, some 
other country will achieve this. Evidence drawn from mainstream or neoclassical 
economics and the economics of STI is often used to underpin digital economy policy. 
The prevailing view is that the rapid commercialization of advanced digital technologies 
works as “a powerful catalyst, and a driver of inclusiveness,” enabling countries to rise 
up the global value chain (Wyckoff, 2016, para. 13), expanding markets, offering greater 
choice to consumers, creating employment, and leading to sustained prosperity. The aim 
of policy is to avoid industry consolidation and the bundling of digital information 
products in ways that restrict competition or slow the pace of innovation and productivity 
growth. Research in neoclassical economics or the STI economics tradition rarely 
questions the directionality of the overall technological pathway and its broader societal 
consequences. As Soete (2016) indicates, policy informed by these traditions is 
predicated on the view that the optimal pathway for digital technological innovation is 
the one selected by the market, that is, as if technological advance is a “force of nature:” 
a self-organizing ecosystem that “creates itself out of itself” (Arthur, 2009, p. 21).  
 
Asymmetrical Power and Technological Innovation  
 
The preceding section emphasizes policy responses informed by, or following 
from, influential strands in the neoclassical economics and STI economics literatures on 
technological innovation. Ex ante policies are not excluded but the emphasis is on ex post 
policies aimed at influencing company strategies once innovative technologies have 
reached the market and without acknowledging the directionality of technological 
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innovation and its broad societal impacts. It is important, however, to consider 
directionality insofar as the dialectic at work in the construction of the socio-technical 
environment is always infused with actual or potential conflicts between what is 
technologically feasible and individual and collectively expressed preferences (Mansell 
& Silverstone, 1996), as well as sustainability considerations. When these diverge, there 
may be a basis for compromise and there may be multiple technological innovation 
pathways or directions that could be pursued. Achieving a different direction after 
substantial investment has been made in a particular pathway through research and 
development spending and as a result of commercialization by relying on ex post policy 
changes is likely to be very difficult given the public and private commitments that have 
been made.  
 
Other academic traditions are much more likely to consider the directionality of 
digital technological innovation, alternative pathways, and the broader societal 
consequences of asymmetrical power relations. Over the past 25 or 30 years, research 
drawing upon sociology, anthropology, philosophy and other disciplines has inspired 
investigations of the relationships between society and technological innovation, 
sometimes working closely with computer scientists. This work has been conducted 
largely in parallel with those working in or near the neoclassical economics discipline 
and the STI economics field. This research provides insight into the multiple ways in 
which digital technological innovation is shaped by combinations of cultural, social, 
political, and economic factors. Researchers acknowledge that “technology is an 
instrument of power” (Hecht & Allen, 2001, p. 1), as, for example, in research inspired 
by Thomas Hughes which has shown how, historically, various actors have made a 
difference to technological design decisions. In what is designated as the Social 
Construction of Technology Systems (SCOTS) tradition,8 the focus is on specific 
                                                 
8 The SCOTS tradition is associated with the work of Wiebe Bijker, Michel Callon, 
Thomas Hughes, Trevor Pinch, and Steve Woolgar, among others (see Bijker et al., 2012) 
and a variety of other labels may be used. 
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technologies or large technical systems and empirical work examines the technical and 
non-technical aspects of the innovation process by seeking to understand the motivations 
and actions of individuals, “relevant social groups,” “system builders,” or actors and 
“actants” (Bijker et al. 2012). 
 
Research in this tradition demonstrates the scope for interpretive flexibility with 
regard to the design, deployment, and use of technology. It does so using mainly 
qualitative research methods that are not commonly found in the economist’s and or 
economics of STI scholar’s toolbox. It has shown that technology designs (hardware, 
software, network architectures) may become embedded in a more or less stable 
configuration over time, but that this process is never fully complete. In this tradition, the 
technological innovation process and the emergence of new technical architectures do not 
occur in an uncontested knowledge space (Selin, 2007; van Schewick, 2016). Strands of 
this work have been taken up in fields such as human computer interaction (HCI) 
research, especially as HCI researchers increasingly seek to link micro- and macro-level 
analysis of the technological innovation process, in contemporary studies of the 
materiality of technology, and in the emerging fields of platform and infrastructure 
studies, as well as in subfields of information systems or science (Gillespie et al., 2014; 
Orlikowski & Scott, 2008; Plantin et al., 2016). Work in these areas demonstrates the 
malleability of digital technological systems and it may employ implicit or explicit 
theories of power relationships.  
 
Contributors to these traditions have tended to eschew normative positions or 
addressing policy directly (Hecht & Allen, 2001). This is said to be changing, however, 
as scholars grapple in the contemporary period with the design of future digital 
technologies and with the ethical implications they are raising for individuals and 
society.9 In the context of debates about the contemporary digital technological 
                                                 
9 Consideration of alternative futures and ethics is not new. Norbert Weiner’s early 
concern with “the human use of human beings” was echoed in Social Informatics 
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innovation pathway with its emphasis on the creation of intelligent machines, for 
example, questions are being asked about the capacity of humans to control the digital 
system and about the governance arrangements needed to ensure that algorithms and data 
are managed in a way that is consistent with the values of social justice and inclusion 
(Kallinikos & Constantiou, 2015). Scholars such as Zuboff are expressing concern about 
the directionality of innovation and suggesting that the computerization of everyday life 
is encouraging configurations of asymmetrical power that present risks to citizens as a 
result of “a new kind of automaticity” (2015, p. 82). 
 
This scholarship is influencing digital technology designers, business managers 
and strategists, and, in some cases, government policy. When it does influence policy it 
has the potential to operate to counter, or moderate, the race to innovation along the 
contemporary digital technological innovation pathway which is typical of digital 
economy policy as discussed above. It provides an evidence base that can serve to 
challenge policy makers who are often inclined to take the design and consequences of a 
given technological innovation pathway as unproblematic or inevitable. Often using 
micro-level methods, research in these traditions consistently challenges the idea of a 
neutral scientific or technological innovation pathway leading in any straightforward way 
to the progressive improvement of the human condition. An example of digital economy 
policy which benefits from research into the flexibility or malleability of technology 
design is the efforts made to enact privacy and data protection policies. In the European 
Union, the latest iteration in policy designed to protect individuals’ personal data is the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which emphasizes “data protection by 
design” and “data protection by default” (EC, 2016b). This regulation encourages the 
                                                                                                                                                 
research, by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) members, and in 
the 1980s, by Donna Haraway, Sherry Turkle, Shoshanna Zuboff, and many other 
scholars who cannot be cited here. All of these scholars signaled similar concerns and 
some sought to build bridges between instrumental and critical research traditions (see 
also Mansell, 2012). 
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adoption of technical design features and architectures aimed at making it easier for 
consumers and citizens to protect their personal data. When the legislation is 
implemented, companies will be required to ensure that the operations of existing and 
future electronic services meet the standards mandated for personal data protection. This 
legislation updates previous legislation and, in this sense, it can be regarded as an ex post 
response to the technological capabilities for data mining, processing, and analyzing 
personally identifying data that have been commercialized in the marketplace. With the 
passage time, if it is effective, it will have an impact on the future designs and operations 
of online digital services and it could then be regarded as a precautionary or ex ante 
policy response.  
 
A key component of this legislation is the individual’s right to an explanation of 
how decisions resulting from algorithmic processes have been made and doubts have 
been expressed about the feasibility of implementation. If these doubts are confirmed, 
this may prove to be because technological innovation has exceeded the capacity of this 
“disclosure” approach to regulation to be effective and the legislative process will have 
produced “toothless” legislation (Wachter et al., 2016). Alternatives will be needed to 
moderate digital platform company strategy and the operational designs of their services 
within the framework of the existing technological pathway. In other instances, policy 
initiatives may lead to architectural changes in digital platform-based services such as 
filters to protect children, changes in the way aggregation platforms such as Facebook 
moderate content, or measures to track online trolls and bullies, but these changes 
commonly occur after the technologies have been released in the marketplace. It is in this 
sense that they can be regarded as ex post, that is, undertaken in response to the 
assumption of a singular technological trajectory.  
 
Alternative Digital Technological Innovation Futures 
 
The discourse around technological inevitability and adaptation to mitigate risk 
and to secure industrial economic competitiveness which is so prominent in the popular 
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press and in digital economy policy is deeply entrenched. It performs as a dominant 
social imaginary (Mansell, 2012; Taylor, 2004), making it difficult, but not impossible, 
for policy makers, and indeed, some scholars, to imagine alternative digital technology 
innovation pathways and how they might be achieved. For many digital economy policy 
makers, their hopes for the future as a result of following the current pathway are 
accompanied by the caveat that “no one is certain where this transformation leads or 
ends, but it is fast moving and all-encompassing” (House of Lords, 2015, p. 8). Their 
hopes also are moderated by what computer scientists and hardware and software 
developers offer by way of encouraging expectations for improving the safety and 
reliability of digital technology systems,10 but the innovation pathway itself is rarely 
called into question. This is despite the fact that in the critical literature, for instance, in 
the field of media and communication studies, it is understood that “mediated connection 
and interconnection define the dominant infrastructure for the conduct of social, political 
and economic life across the globe” (Silverstone, 2007, p. 26). This dominant role 
suggests the need to evaluate whether the directionality of mediated connection is 
consistent with achieving desired social and economic outcomes. 
 
Advances in artificial intelligence research and its applications in the commercial 
market have triggered a recent round of consultations aimed at considering the need for 
new policy measures, potentially before the applications reach the market. For example, 
in the United Kingdom, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee has 
noted that “it is vital that careful scrutiny of the ethical, legal and societal dimensions of 
artificially intelligent systems begins now” (House of Commons, 2016, para. 71). To this 
end, a Commission on Artificial Intelligence has been established to consider the 
principles that should govern the application of artificial intelligence techniques to help 
ensure that they are socially beneficial. Although it remains to be seen what the 
Commission’s recommendations will be, the precedents discussed above suggest that ex 
                                                 
10 See transcript of evidence in support of the House of Commons (2016) report on robots 
and artificial intelligence at http://tinyurl.com/zd2639s  
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ante policy interventions will be avoided. In Europe, consultation is underway in the 
European Parliament to consider, among other things, whether robots should be treated as 
“electronic persons” with rights and duties and liability for damage. An ethical 
framework has been proposed for discussion, guided by the principles of “beneficence, 
non-maleficence and autonomy” and by a consideration of matters of dignity, freedoms, 
equality, solidarity, justice and citizens’ rights as required by the European Union Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (EP, 2016, para. 7). The Obama Administration’s National 
Science and Technology Council strategic initiative and its related interdisciplinary and 
multi-actor workshops11 on the future of artificial intelligence have yielded the 
observation that discussions about future expectations have not been common in the past 
or conducted in a systematic way (US, 2016). Crawford and Whittaker’s (2016) summary 
of one of the workshops emphasizes that it is essential to consider how it can be assured 
that the digital technology systems that are in the experimental stage will not be harmful 
when they enter the market.  
 
In each of these examples in this sub-field of digital ecosystem innovation, 
forums are being created for an interdisciplinary and critically informed debate and the 
issue of ex ante intervention in the form of regulation is at least being considered. This 
may help to foster the design and deployment of artificial intelligence-inspired 
applications where decisions are not made principally by global players such as Google, 
Facebook and Amazon (and potentially other global players with headquarters in other 
parts of the world). Instead, they may be the result of collaborations among policy 
makers, academic and industry experts, and citizens with a view to guiding the 
technological innovation pathway so that it does not harm the disadvantaged and is 
consistent with the best interests of humanity (Hall et al., 2016), a hope that is articulated 
by leading computers scientists and social scientists.   
 
Critical Interdisciplinary Engagement on Digital Technological Innovation 
                                                 
11 Workshop presentations are available at http://tinyurl.com/z23uwpy. 
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Evidence is accumulating with regard to the links between social and economic 
inequality and employment challenges and about the frequently claimed erosion of the 
capacity of humans to exercise control over their digital environment, especially as the 
current digital technological innovation pathway yields an intelligent decision making 
apparatus where automated decisions are increasingly unaccountable (Couldry & Powell, 
2014; Turow, 2011). Kitchin (2017) calls for the use of research methods such as 
genealogies of code, auto-ethnographies of coding practices, interviews with coding 
teams, and examinations of the tasks that algorithms perform together with reverse 
engineering of algorithm computations in order to understand the implications of their 
further development. These methods also could be applied in the analysis of other facets 
of the digital ecosystem and Kitchin suggests that examinations of the “full socio-
technical assemblage” are needed, including “analysis of the reasons for subjecting the 
system to the logic of computation in the first place” (Kitchen, 2017, p. 25). 
 
To undertake a “full” analysis, or more broadly, an analysis of the directionality 
of the emerging digital technology system and its consequences, the structural or macro-
level market and other institutional developments arguably would have to be examined. 
This suggests that some of the approaches offered by economic analysis can be helpful. 
Despite its assumption regarding the inevitability of a singular pathway, the STI 
economics tradition can bring evidence to bear on dysfunctionality associated with 
adjustment processes involving employment losses and income disparities or identify 
evidence of the detrimental impacts of market power. The tools of economic analysis, 
including simulations, can also be used to ask questions about how outcomes might be 
different and about what would need to change. Such tools can be applied on a macro or 
aggregate scale or at a micro or firm level. The methods employed in economic analysis 
are quantitative and, as a result, they are less helpful in identifying and characterizing the 
processes that might enable alternatives to be pursued or achieved through changes in 
regulations or incentives when asymmetrical power relations are involved.   
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A further reason for turning to STI economics is with regard to the analysis of 
inequality associated with digital technological innovation. Here, a key question is 
whether the assumed “natural” trajectory of change is consistent with aspirations to 
preserve human autonomy––and, as some argue, human flourishing. Digital economy 
policy is particularly influenced by those who draw upon economic analysis to support 
their views about whether ex post and/or ex ante policy interventions are justified. This is 
especially so in competition policy considerations of market failure and multisided digital 
platform dynamics and in discussions about the potentially discriminatory roles of 
platform leaders and gatekeepers (Evans & Schmallensee, 2014, Gawer, 2009; Mansell, 
2015). Models and research results derived from neoclassical and STI economics 
traditions are regularly cited directly or indirectly via consultancy reports on the digital 
economy and in digital economy policy documentation. They are also often relied upon 
in legal arguments about the need for regulatory intervention. Policy makers concerned 
with the dynamics of the economy and the trajectory for digital innovation do not often 
turn to the results of research in the SCOTS and other critical research areas, despite the 
fact that there is much they could learn from them. 
 
Working towards an interdisciplinary research agenda that embraces some strands 
of economic analysis alongside other critical traditions in the social sciences is also likely 
to be helpful insofar as critical strands of research in economics acknowledge that market 
power matters. Market power can provide companies operating in oligopolistic markets 
with the ability to disproportionately influence market outcomes and result in 
technological progress that is not aligned with the broader interests of society (Atkinson, 
2015). In response to the existing pathway of digital technological innovation and 
contemporary evidence of increasing job insecurity, and even if the timing and scale of 
the future impacts is uncertain, some economists are proposing policies aimed at 
addressing technologically induced inequality. Their proposals are attaining a higher 
profile in policy fora than has been the case in earlier periods of digital technology 
innovation, not the least because of problems created by financial crises and social unrest. 
These policies include progressive income and wealth taxation to address growing 
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income inequality at the national level and wage subsidies or conditional or unconditional 
basic income guarantees for those who find they cannot participate in the labour force 
because they lack the skills or because their jobs have been automated (Berger & Frey, 
2016; Piketty, 2014).12 Thus, economists working within the critical economics 
framework are explicitly acknowledging that “technological progress is not a force of 
nature but reflects social and economic decisions” taken by specific actors (Atkinson, 
2015, p. 3).  
 
In the STI economics tradition, Freeman (1992) earlier emphasized the need to 
assess the broad societal consequences of technological change and, potentially, to slow 
or alter the direction of technological change using ex ante policies.13 Scholars working 
in this tradition are starting to reengage with a broader range of societal issues and 
questioning the assumption that a faster pace of technological innovation and largely ex 
post adjustments to the disruptive forces of creative destruction are necessarily good for 
society. Soete asks, for example, “could it be that innovation is not always good for 
you?” (2016, p. 14).  He suggests that “destructive creation” may be becoming the norm 
in some areas of the economy and he emphasizes the need to investigate how the digital 
technology innovation pathway is related to financial and employment crises and why the 
benefits of technological innovation are available to “the few at the expense of the many” 
(Soete, 2016, p. 14). Extending the range of concerns conventionally addressed within the 
STI economics framework, Mazzucato and Perez (2015) call for a proactive (and ex ante) 
policy agenda to guide the digital technological innovation pathway, insisting on the need 
for an informed citizenry to collaborate with academics and with policy makers in 
                                                 
12 These policies are controversial, see EP (2016b) for information about trials. 
13 Scholars working in the STI economics tradition such as Charles Edquist, Chris 
Freeman, Bengt-Åke Lundvall, Richard Nelson, Carlota Perez, and others have stressed 
the importance of research aimed at analyzing the institutional contexts of innovation, 
mainly, the institutions engaged in research and development, and innovation and 
learning.  
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selecting a technological pathway that is most likely to secure equitable outcomes and 
sustainability as envisaged by the United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Goals 
(UN, 2015).  
 
There are other indications of new efforts to foster collaborative research among 
scholars working in the STI economics tradition and in some branches of the SCOTS 
tradition. Schot and Steinmueller (2016), for example, observe that the STI economics 
field over the last 50 years has been largely instrumental and that there is a need to focus 
research on the directionality of technological innovation and its broad societal 
consequences. In addition to their concern with research and development, the structural 
characteristics of digital technology markets (and in other fields such as energy) and the 
need for ex post policies, they call for a new framing of policy issues that would 
emphasize the inclusion of civil society in participatory approaches to the choices about 
which technologies should be brought to the market. Their explicit aim is to address the 
broad social purposes of technological innovation and to acknowledge that there are 
always multiple potential directions for technological transformation. They argue that this 
kind of engagement could help to foster “the creation of negotiation spaces or market 
niches for alternative technologies to become established, capture imaginations and win 
constituencies among actors that would otherwise be excluded” (Schot & Steinmueller, 
2016, p. 17) from policy formulation and implementation. In addition to bridges that are 
being built across these research traditions, there is engagement between HCI and 
political economy scholars. For example, Ekbia and Nardi (2016) call for a closer link 
between micro-ethnographic approaches and the approaches familiar to non-neoclassical 
economists, political economy of communication scholars, and critical sociologists, 
anthropologists, and geographers.14  
 
These efforts work to problematize the contemporary digital technological 
innovation pathway by introducing critical theories of power and the way power relations 
                                                 
14 Citing, e.g., Mosco (2009) and Piketty (2014).  
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influence technological innovation at all levels. They could provide a more robust basis 
upon which policy makers can assess whether digital technology systems are being 
designed in the laboratory and commercialized in the marketplace in ways that are 
consistent with broad societal goals and, on occasion, yield ex ante policy responses. 
Assuming that these collaborative ambitions materialize and produce results, the insights 
of this work can be introduced to digital economy policy makers by scholars who 
participate as advisors or who work as activists for, or with, civil society organizations 
and, indeed, as consultants to industry.  
 
In summary, the dominant imaginary in many policy discussions concerned with 
the prospects for the competitiveness of the digital economy is of a digital technological 
environment that beneficially augments human-machine, machine-machine, and human-
human relationships, albeit with risks which can be managed. Insofar as it is informed by 
evidence from the social sciences, this comes principally from neoclassical economics or 
the STI economics tradition. The result is that it gives relatively little attention to cultural 
and social values such as altruism or how best to ensure that digital technological 
advances foster solidarity and human dignity or flourishing. Digital economy policy is 
mostly characterized as transitional with the aim of responding to a disruptive period in 
which there is a mismatch between the skills and other resources required to participate 
productively within the evolving digital economy as it progresses along a pathway 
towards the greater use of computational and artificial intelligence systems. Views about 
the timing of the introduction of technological solutions to the market and the capacity to 
design in societal values differ among experts, but, nonetheless, it is hoped that solutions 
to harms and safety risks will be found by technology developers and/or effectively 
mandated by ex post legislation.  
 
This is not to minimize the efforts of critical scholars who engage with policy 
making for the digital economy and their impacts, but to characterize the view that is 
most frequently displayed in the discourse of digital economy policy. Nor is the intention 
to minimize the challenges of governing the digital environment. Both ex ante and ex 
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post policy making are costly, time consuming, and highly politicized. Even small shifts 
in policy favouring broader societal interests (beyond the prospects for economic growth 
and productivity gains and the fortunes of monopolistic companies) can be hard fought 
and difficult to achieve when set against a political economy that favors the interests of 
the large digital platform companies and hardware, software, and component equipment 
suppliers.  
The suggestion here is not that there is a lack of vision of alternative technological 
pathways within branches of critical academic scholarship. Scholars working in the 
political economy tradition such as McChesney and Nichols argue, for example, that the 
current digital technological innovation pathway will lead to “the mass genocidal 
elimination of much of the world’s surplus and disposable population” (2016, p. 264) if 
steps are not taken to change the prevailing pathway. Benkler (2016) provides insight into 
policy and legal contests over standards, architectures, and regulations which, when they 
are won by companies whose principal interest is in attaining market dominance, work 
against the potential for fostering alternatives to the commercial market such as 
collaborative sharing in online relationships. Other examples include Lovink (2016) who 
sets out a vision of an alternative pathway using “collective awareness platforms” to 
resist unequal power structures. Mason (2015), a journalist who draws on political 
economy and complexity theory, envisages the adaptive spontaneity of computational 
digital technologies which he suggests will yield a more equitable form of capitalism. 
These scholars foresee a technological innovation pathway that favors open networks, 
commons-based production, a reasonable standard of transparency, and a capacity for 
human authority and control over the digital ecology, consistent with increasing social 
and economic equality and sustainability, but this is not the dominant vision embraced by 
digital economy policy makers.   
 
Conclusion 
 
With contemporary research evidence yielding forecasts, albeit controversially, of 
imminent job losses, the end of work as we know it, and in the wake of high profile 
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discussions about the societal risks associated with the automation of daily life and the 
economy, there are opportunities to influence the directionality of the digital 
technological innovation pathway, potentially, through proactive ex ante, as well as ex 
post, policies. The emerging interdisciplinary research base could help to reshape the 
mainstream of digital economy policy making. The combination of research in the critical 
social science traditions, including economics (evolutionary economists working in the 
STI field and critical economists concerned with inequality) could yield improved insight 
into the conditions that produce inequality and evaluations of the risk of a potential loss 
of human authority over augmented intelligence embedded in networks and services. This 
could help to demonstrate to policy makers charged with promoting the digital economy 
that there is more scope for alternative technological futures than they normally allow for. 
This could lead to discussions about what measures are needed to achieve a different 
pathway. Even if advances in machine learning and algorithmic technique increasingly 
tend to “rule out, [and] render invisible, other potential futures” (Amoore, 2011, p. 38), 
alternative digital technological innovation policies could start to have greater traction, 
even if the main focus of policy makers remains on competition and on the rate of 
economic growth.  
 
If the conventional evidence base for digital economy policy is combined with the 
critical analysis of the economy-wide and institutional as well as the micro-level features 
of the digital technological innovation pathway, the results could help to moderate the 
propagation of increasingly less transparent algorithms and difficult to control artificial 
intelligence applications. The suggestion is not that intelligent machines should never be 
brought to market, but that it is crucial to broaden the debate in digital economy policy 
circles. This seems more likely to happen if researchers are better able to translate 
disparate theoretically and methodologically grounded findings across critical and 
mainstream or instrumental research traditions. This is clearly challenging but there are 
signs that efforts are being made within the critical research domains. Those critical 
researchers who do engage in policy making forums concerned with digital economy 
policy regularly encounter mainstream economic arguments and are usually adept at 
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challenging them. A more comprehensive evidence base has the potential to destabilize 
received wisdom and to provoke new ex ante policy measures where they are needed. 
Some readers may argue that in the contemporary phase of capitalism it is not reasonable 
to hope that the major (or minor players) in the commercial digital industry will alter 
course towards computational systems that meet desired standards of protection, 
consistent with citizen rights and a more equitable and sustainable future, except at the 
margins. If, however, “destructive creation” is shown to be the most likely outcome of 
the current technological innovation pathway, then digital economy policy relying mainly 
on ex post adaptive policy responses could start to be coupled with the greater use of ex 
ante policy measures. 
 
The critical traditions of research on digital technological innovation considered 
in this paper tell us that asymmetrical power relations which may appear to be locked in 
to a particular pathway are, in fact, contingent and subject to alteration. Engaging in 
narratives about possible futures, building on insights from formerly parallel scholarly 
traditions, including some branches of economics, may help to encourage the mediation 
of hope for a better future in a way that leads to proactive ex ante policy responses which 
mobilize and re-orient investment along a different pathway. In the context of debates 
about the future of artificial intelligence and the digital ecology and its implications for 
individuals and society, this could help to moderate the prevailing imaginary and practice 
of technological innovation policy in the digital ecology, that is, the view that it is “too 
soon to set down sector-wide regulations for this nascent field” (House of Commons, 
2016, para 71).  
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